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Regulating Culture: The Audiovisual 
Controversy in the GATT Accordt 
INTRODUCTION 
The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)l, created in 
1947, strives to ensure that all countries enjoy equal access to the 
trade and raw materials of the world.2 GATT's primary thrust is its 
commitment to limit tariffs that a country will apply to the import 
of goods, and the generalization of these commitments to all GATT 
parties through the Most-Favored-Nation clause.3 In addition, GATT 
was constructed to perform the following functions: 1) protect the 
value of tariff concessions against nullification by non tariff import 
barriers; 2) establish a code of trade conduct to steer protectionist 
devices away from certain specific barriers; and 3) implement con-
sultation procedures and joint action to perform the agreement's 
organizational functions. 4 
In its early years, GATT guided the growth of international trade.5 
More recently, it has served to control the protectionist tendencies 
of its participants.6 GATT has attempted to increase and encourage 
international trade through four rounds of multilateral negotia-
tions. 7 Since the formation of GATT, the Dillon Round (1960-62), 
the Kennedy Round (1963-67) and the Tokyo Round (1975-79) all 
resulted in tariff reductions.s Mter the end of the Tokyo Round, 
tThe author gratefully wishes to thank John Hitt for his helpful comments and support. 
I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATTJ. 
2J.G. Starke, Fortieth Anniversary of GAIT, 62 AUSTL. LJ. 175, 175 (1988). 
3 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 29 (1969). The Most-Favored-
Nation clause provides that when a GATT Member State grants an advantage with regard to 
an imported product from another country, an advantage must also be accorded to a similar 
product coming from any other GATT Member State. GATT, supra note 1, at art. 1; see Brian 
L. Ross, "[ Love Lucy," But the European Community Doesn't: Apparent Protectionism in the 
European Community's Broadcast Market, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 529, 542 (1990). 
4jACKSON, supra note 3, at 29. 
5 Dennis Thompson, GAIT's Fortieth Birthday, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 5 (1988). 
6 [d. 
7 See Finn Laursen, The EC, GATT, and the Uruguay Rnund, in THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 375 (Leon Hurwitz & Christian Lequesne eds., 1991). 
8 [d. at 375-76. 
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impetus for new negotiations resulted in the commencement, in 
1987, of the Uruguay Round.9 In this round, some of the proposed 
topics for inclusion in GATT comprised textiles, agriculture, intel-
lectual property rights and trade-related investment measures. lO 
Mter seven agonizing years, the European Union (EU)]] and the 
United States, among other participants, finally agreed on several 
contentious issues and concluded the Uruguay Round of GATT on 
December 14, 1993.12 On April 15, 1994, ministers from 109 coun-
tries signed the most ambitious trade pact in history-an agreement 
which aims to reduce import tariffs by an average of forty percent.13 
For the first time, trade in key areas like financial services and 
agriculture now will be subject to international trade regulations. 14 
At the time of its signing in Marrakesh, Morocco, U.S. Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore described the impact of GATT as "truly momentous" 
and expressed support for the pact as a deal which is expected to 
stimulate overall growth of U.S. exports. IS The GATT secretariat, more-
over, estimated the pact would increase global economic output by 
over $235 billion by the year 2002.16 On December 8, 1994, U.S. 
President Bill Clinton signed legislation implementing the Uruguay 
Round multilateral trade agreement negotiated under the GATT.17 
Although previously controversial issues such as agriculture, tex-
tiles and financial services were almost completely resolved, EU and 
U.S. negotiators merely reached an "agreement to disagree" on 
major entertainment industry issues. IS Movies, television, popular 
9 Id. at 376-77. 
10 Id. at 377. 
11 The European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU) when the Maastricht 
Treaty took force in November 1993. See Treaty of the European Union and Final Act, 7 Feb. 
1992, art. R, 311.L.M. 247, 330. To ensure accuracy, this Comment will refer to all occurrences 
before November 1993 as EC activity and to all post-November 1993 occurrences as EU activity. 
12 Diana Lady Dougan, Perspectives on Trade; Europe Draws an Electronic Curtain, L.A. TIMES, 
January 14, 1994, at B7; Valenti Charges EC Protectionism On Audiovisuals, REUTERS, Dec. H, 
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File [hereinafter Valenti Charges EC Protec-
tionism]. 
13 Alan Riding, 109 Countries Sign Far-Reaching Trade Agreement, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
April 16, 1994,at 1A. 
14 A New Era in World Trade, IRISH TIMES, April 16, 1994, at II. 
15 Riding, supra note 13, at 1A. 
16 Guy De Jonquieres, GATT: Uruguay lWund Completed After 8 Years, FIN. TIMES (London), 
April 16, 1994, at 2. 
17 Clinton Signs GATT Legislation, Says Trade Will Spur Economy, BNA International Trade 
Daily, Dec. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The Senate approved GATT 
implementing legislation by 76-24 on Dec. 2,1994, while the House of Representatives voted 
288-146 in favor of the legislation on Nov. 29, 1994. Id. 
18 See Marc Sandalow & Carolyn Lochhead, Historic Global Trade Pact; GATT Issues Resolved 
By 116 Nations, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1993, at AI; Dougan, supra note 12, at B7. 
1995] AUDIOVISUAL CONTROVERSY IN GATT 445 
music and other audiovisual products thus remain exempted from 
GATT. 
To recognize the significance of the exemption of audiovisual 
products from GATT in light of the expanding U.S. participation in 
the European entertainment market, one need only examine the 
relevant statistics.19 American-made movies presently account for 
sixty percent of the market in France and seventy-two percent of the 
market in the rest of the EU.20 French films, in contrast, hold less 
than one percent of the U.S. market. 21 In the television sphere, U.S. 
programs comprise over twenty-five percent of the market in Europe, 
while European exports are rarely made available for viewing in the 
United States.22 Overall, audiovisual products trail only commercial 
aircraft in total U.S. exports. 23 
The United States, buoyed by the Hollywood-based entertainment 
industry, lobbied for the inclusion of audiovisual products in the 
GATT accord in an effort both to relax European quotas on foreign 
television programs and to win the right to share in the profits 
earned from European films.24 On the other side of the bargaining 
table, the EU, led by France, argued that the exemption of audio-
visual products from GATT was necessary to preserve distinct Euro-
pean culture from dilution by cultural imports.25 Nevertheless, de-
spite continuing discord regarding audiovisual products, negotiators 
on both sides concluded that the success of the entire GATT accord 
should not be forestalled by disagreement concerning just one in-
dustry.26 Accordingly, notwithstanding their differences, EU and U.S. 
negotiators eventually sealed the pact. 
19 See Chris Fuller, GAIT Sez Scat to H'wood; France Hails, Valenti Rails at A/V Omission 
From World Pact, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 15, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Fuller, GAIT Sez Scat]. 
20Id. 
21 Id. This disparity may be due, in part, to a belief in the United States that viewers dislike 
subtitles and dubbing. See id. 
22Id. The EU argues that the United States already holds 70,000 hours of European 
television time, about 28% of the market. In the United States, only the British garner sales 
that are anything greater than insignificant. Chris Fuller, Audio-Visual Gums Up GAIT Talks, 
VARIETY, Dec. 20,1993, at 27 [hereinafter Fuller, Audio-Visual Gums Up GAIT Talks]. 
23 Fuller, GAIT Sez Scat, supra note 19, at 1. In the EU, annual sales of U.S. films, television 
shows and videocassettes total about $3.7 billion. On the other hand, the EU exports only 
about $300 million of audiovisual products to the United States. Id. 
24 Leslie Adler, GAIT Accord Angers Hollywood, But Wrath Is Muted, REUTERS, Dec. 16, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. The United States also proposed a plan to 
enable U.S. companies to share in the profits from European sales of blank audio and 
videotape. This compromise would require the U.S. companies to spend the money earned 
in Europe. Peter Behr, Breakthrough Believed Near On Global Trade Agreement, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 14, 1993, atAl9. 
25 See Adler, supra note 24. 
26 See Keith Bradsher, The World Trade Agreement; the Overview: U.S. and Europe Clear the 
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This Comment will discuss the history of the dispute itself, begin-
ning with the controversial 1989 European Community ''Television 
Without Frontiers" Directive.27 It will then discuss the motivations 
behind the evolution of the Directive's quota system. 28 This Com-
ment will then contrast the countervailing arguments set forth by 
EU negotiators, who contend that the exemption of audiovisual 
products from GATT is essential to preserve European culture, and 
U.S. entertainment industry executives, who contend that the Euro-
pean position is mere economic protectionism cloaked behind the 
guise of protection of cultural heritage.29 This Comment will then 
discuss the impact of the exemption, forecast future trends and 
ultimately conclude that this apparent victory by the EU will be 
short-lived.30 
1. THE INTRODUCTION OF A QUOTA SYSTEM WITHIN THE EC: 
THE "TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS" DIRECTIVE 
On October 3, 1989, the European Community (EC) adopted the 
"Television Without Frontiers" Directive (Directive) 31, a law designed 
to coordinate the broadcasting regulations of its Member States.32 
The Directive sets common quotas concerning television programming 
within the EC, but specifically excludes news, sports and advertis-
ing.33 Article 4, the provision of the Directive which has generated 
Way for a World Accord On Trade, Setting Aside Major Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at 
AI. In fact, Glenn]. Gumpel, executive director of the Directors Guild of America, stated 
"[n]o one on our side believed we should ask the President [Clinton] or [U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative] Mickey Kantor to walk away from the GATT negotiations at [that] point after 
America [had] achieved what it reported in other areas and other industries." ld. 
27 See infra notes 31-54 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 86--102 and accompanying text. 
31 Directive 89/552, Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down 
by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of 
Television Broadcasting Activities, 32 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 23 (1989) [hereinafter 
Directive ]. 
32 For expanded discussion of this Directive, see generally Suzanne Michele Schwartz, 
Television WithoutFrontiers?, 16 N.C.]. INT'L & COM. REG. 351 (1991); Timothy M. Lupinacci, 
The Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities in the European Community: Cultural Preserva-
tion or Economic Protectionism?, 24 VAND. ]. TRANSNAT'L L. 113 (1991); Kelly L. Wilkins, 
Television Without Frontiers: An EEC Broadcasting Premiere, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 195 
(1991); Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler, Television Without Frontiers: opportunity and 
Debate Created l7y the New European Community Directive, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 
495 (1990); Ross, supra note 3. 
33 Presburger & Tyler, supra note 32, at 499. 
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the most controversy, imposes what non-Member States consider to 
be unreasonable restrictions on foreign producers of audiovisual 
products.34 
Many of the Directive's provisions originated in the Green Paper 
On the Establishment Of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially 
By Satellite and Cable ( Green Paper), published in 1984.35 In the Green 
Paper, the European Commission asserted that cross-border trans-
missions within the EC would promote integration and spread cul-
tural enrichment.36 It also contended that cross-border transmissions 
would increase technological innovation within the EC while, at the 
same time, limiting the potential for domination by U.S. media 
giantsY 
The Directive adopts many of the Green Paper's proposals.38 For 
example, article 2 implements the proposal that broadcasting rights 
be extended to all EC Member States.39 Under this article, States can 
restrict transmission of cross-border transmission by another State 
only if the broadcasts would infringe the Directive's safeguards re-
garding the protection of minors.4o In addition, the Directive sets 
minimum standards concerning the regulation of advertising, spe-
cifically banning advertisements for alcohol and tobaccoY 
Nevertheless, while the Directive generally follows the Green Paper, 
it differs in article 4, a controversial provision dealing with "local 
content" broadcasting rules.42 Article 4 of the Directive states, III 
part, that: 
Member States shall ensure where practicable and by ap-
propriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European 
works, within the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion 
of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed 
to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext serv-
34 See Tyler Marshall, European Community Sets Quota for Television Imports, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
4,1989, at 1; see also Presburger & Tyler, supra note 32, at 499. 
35 COM (84) 300 final (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter Green Paper]; see Presburger & Tyler, 
supra note 32, at 496. 
36 See Green Paper, supra note 35. 
37 Id.; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 32, at 496--97. 
38 Aggressive U.S. Stance on Quotas May Have Hurt More Than Helped, VARIETY, Oct. 4,1989, 
at 2. 
39 Pres burger & Tyler, supra note 32, at 498. 
40 Directive, supra note 31, art. 2. 
41 !d. 
42 Pres burger & Tyler, supra note 32, at 499. 
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ices. This proportion ... should be achieved progressively, 
on the basis of suitable criteria.43 
Unlike the Green Paper, which sought to foster a more vigorous in-
digenous entertainment industry, the Directive approach constructs 
the apparatus to implement a quota system for television programs 
and films produced outside the EU.44 Indeed, under the Directive, 
all television channels must contain at least fifty-one percent pro-
gramming from Member States.45 Originally, France had proposed 
a strict rule mandating a sixty percent European content rule.46 
Great Britain and Germany opposed this higher setting of the quota, 
and eventually France relented.47 Moreover, article 4 not only man-
dates a majority EU content standard, but also gives the Member 
States (rather than the individual television channels) the power to 
decide what constitutes practicable and appropriate measures to 
satisfy such standard.48 Finally, article 4 requires Member States to 
report to the Commission every two years to demonstrate that they 
have attempted to implement the quota system.49 
In determining what constitutes a "European work" as applicable 
to article 4, article 6 defines these as broadcasts of works originating 
from EC Member States or from a European non-Member State 
which is a party to the Council of Europe Convention if (a) they are 
produced by one or more entities established in one or more of the 
Member States, (b) the production is supervised and controlled by 
producers established in at least one Member State, or (c) the con-
tribution of co-producers of those States to the total production 
costs is preponderant and the co-production is not controlled by 
one or more producers established outside those States.50 
Although this quota system appears only to affect television, it 
actually directly hinders the sale of U.S.-created films in European 
movie theaters.51 This harm occurs because U.S. film companies 
license film rights to distributors in EU Member States.52 In France, 
43 Directive, supra note 31, art. 4. 
44 See Green Paper; supra note 35; Directive, supra note 31, art. 4. 
45 GAIT Gap Threatens European Satellite Channels, EUROMARKETING, Dec. 21, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Zeurl File. 
46 Rone Tempest, France Wants to Slam Europe's open Door to U.S. Tv, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 
1989, at l. 
471d. 
48 Chris Alderman, EC Oyota Vote Oct. 3; Yank Fallout Minima~ VARIETY, Sept. 27, 1989, at 4. 
49 Directive, supra note 31, art. 4; Presburger & Tyler, supra note 32, at 500. 
50 Directive, supra note 31, art. 6(2). 
51 Adler, supra note 24. 
52 See id. 
1995] AUDIOVISUAL CONTROVERSY IN GAlT 449 
these distributors use the quotas as a tool to extract lower licensing 
fees by arguing that their ability to recover costs is precarious be-
cause they are not guaranteed to sell films to television as well as to 
theaters.53 The existence of this problem is corroborated by U.S. film 
industry executives.54 
II. MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE EVOLUTION OF THE DIRECTIVE'S 
QUOTA SYSTEM 
EU Member States contend that the quota system embodied in 
article 4 of the Directive is necessary to preserve European cultural 
identity from the dominance of its media markets by foreign, non-
European works.55 Member States view the unique culture of coun-
tries within the EU as cultural capital formed over many centuries.56 
As such, Europeans believe that culture should not be allocated in 
an open market according to general economic principles. 57 
The quota system also evolved because media producers in the 
EU are thought to be at a competitive disadvantage with their coun-
terparts in the United States.58 While media producers in different 
European countries tend to be very small and generate products in 
different languages, U.S. media producers are larger and produce 
television programs and films in English.59 This gives the U.S. com-
panies access to a far broader market.60 Therefore, in an effort to 
protect their own broadcasting industries, European television and 
film producers maintained that quotas were the ideal vehicle to 
prevent domination by U.S. companies.61 
53 [d. 
54 [d. Indeed, according to Jonas Rosenfield, President of the American Film Association, 
"This is a real problem that our members are facing in France." [d. 
55 Ross, supra note 3, at 529-30. 
56 See Laurence G. C. Kaplan, The European Community's "Television Without Frontiers" 
Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 255, 315 (1994). 
57 See id. To some, cultural capital is critical to the survival of Member States. See id. As 
explained by Kaplan: 
[d. 
There was a long tradition of state regulation of goods that were not considered to 
be ordinary goods. In eighteenth century France, such state regulation was of grain 
and bread. Culture was in many ways the grain of the 1980s: it was too important to 
be left in the hands of the merchants. 
58 Schwartz, supra note 32, at 351-52. 
59 [d. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
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In addition, the quota system developed in response to a growing 
U.S. presence on European television in the 1980s due to an expan-
sion in the number of television channels and an increased desire 
for programming.62 Many European producers chose to purchase 
U.S. programs63 because it was far more economically efficient to 
purchase an English language product and dub it into the local 
language than to try to create an original production from its be-
ginning stages.64 
Finally, according to EU insiders, intensive anti-quota lobbying by 
the United States also contributed to the Directive's enactment.65 
Indeed, former British Broadcasting Company (BBC) executive David 
Webster stated: "[t]he American pressure has been of such a nature 
that it has irritated most European countries. It may have persuaded 
the French that the Directive may have been a good idea after all, 
because if it annoys the Americans that much, there must be some-
thing good about it. "66 
III. THE DEBATE REGARDING MOTIVATIONS BEHIND EFFORTS TO 
EXEMPT AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS FROM THE GATT ACCORD: EU 
VS. U.S. PERSPECTIVES 
The EU Member States entered GATT's Uruguay Round with 
three main objectives.67 First, the EU wanted the quota system intro-
duced in the Directive to remain intact.68 This would ensure expo-
sure for local-made films programmed on European television, but 
would also include an "opt-out" clause to enable certain Member 
States to avoid these limits.69 Second, the EU wanted local broadcast 
entities to continue to receive subsidies.70 Third, the EU desired the 
flexibility to manipulate these systems of quotas and subsidies based 
on future changes in the audiovisual industry.7! France, in addition 
62 Adler, supra note 24. 
63Id. While it could cost millions of dollars to produce just one episode of a French 
television series, one episode of a show produced by a U.S. company can be purchased for 
merely $50,000. Id. 
64 Id. According to Jonas Rosenfield, a one-hour program that costs $1.5 million to produce 
can be dubbed for less than $100,000. Id. 
65 Schwartz, supra note 32, at 353. 
66 Id. 
67 Fuller, Audio-Visual Gums Up GATT Talks, supra note 22, at 27. 
68Id. 
69Id. 
70 See id. 
71Id. 
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to maintaining the aforementioned objectives, feared that unless all 
audiovisual issues were exempted from the GATT accord, the Direc-
tive's provisions would be dismantled and the market within the EU 
for domestic entertainment products would evaporate.72 
The rationale underlying the EU objective to exempt all audio-
visual products from GATT appears motivated by the same type of 
divergent concerns as the Directive. On the one hand, by means of 
the exemption, the EU contends that it is seeking to preserve na-
tional and regional identities within the EU.n On the other hand, 
U.S. film executives claim that the EU is practicing economic pro-
tectionism and that Member States desire an exemption to equalize 
the competitive disadvantages that they necessarily confront in the 
audiovisual industry.74 
The EU views restrictions on audiovisual products primarily as a 
means to preserve national European culture and combat the "ter-
rifying menace" posed by U.S. popular culture.75 In a public letter 
published in entertainment industry newspapers in Hollywood, Cali-
fornia, well-known European directors joined to write: "[ w] e are 
only desperately defending the tiny margin of freedom left to us. 
We are trying to protect European cinema against its complete 
annihilation."76 These directors contend that U.S. films and televi-
sion productions have the potential to engulf and, thus, eliminate 
indigenous European works.77 If the United States is successful, they 
stated, "there will be no more European film industry left by the 
year 2000."78 
From the U.S. perspective, many leaders within the U.S. entertain-
ment industry characterize the motives of EU media producers as 
economic, rather than cultural, protectionism.79 For example, Jack 
Valenti, chief of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) , 
the studios' primary lobbyist for twenty-five years, claims that the 
72 See Fuller, Audio-Visual Gums Up GAIT Talks, supra note 22, at 27. 
73 See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 32, at 505; see also supra notes 55-57 and accompanying 
text. 
74 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
75 Stephen Chapman, The Real Enemy In the Battle to Save European Culture, CHI. TRm., Jan. 
2, 1994, at 3C. 
76 Bernard Weinraub, Even Hollywood Plays a IWle in GAIT; Europe Wants Quotas on 
American Films and U.S. Cries Foul, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 12, 1993, at A-18. The European 
directors who signed the letter include Pedro Almodovar (Spain), Bernardo Bertolucci (Italy), 
David Puttnam (England), Stephen Frears (England), and Wim Wenders (Germany). Id. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. 
79 See infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
452 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVIII, No.2 
objectives of the EU in the audiovisual area during the GATT accord 
did not concern cultural preservation at all.80 He states, however, 
that the culture stance was nothing more than a smokescreen for 
financial concerns and that "[t]his is all about the hard business of 
money."81 This view has been corroborated by other U.S. film execu-
tives who characterize the stance of the French government as pure 
arrogance and anti-American protectionism.82 
These strong views and claims of protectionism by U.S. film in-
dustry players and executives might stem, in part, from the EU's 
rejection of the proposals set forth by U.S. negotiators during last-
minute GATT discussions.83 In any event, there are legitimate con-
80 David Dodwell, U.S. opts to Bide Time on Audio-Visual Battle, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 
15, 1993, at 6; Weinraub, supra note 76, at A-18. Said Valenti: "If you equate Europe's game 
shows and talk shows with Moliere and Racine, then that's about culture. But the culture issue 
is a transparent cloak, and I want to disrobe Europe on this." Dodwell, supra. 
81 Valenti Charges EC Protectionism, supra note 12. Valenti argues that the U.S. film industry 
has occupied such a large portion of the market in Europe because of the relative superiority 
of U.S. films. See Dodwell, supra note 80, at 6. The rise in the U.S. share of the film market 
in France "was due not to rising U.S. showings, but to falling audiences for French films." Id. 
Indeed, between 1983 and 1992, the total audiences for French-made films in French movie 
theaters declined from 90 million to 48 million per year, while U.S. productions fell only 
slightly, from 70 million to 68 million. Id. 
82 See Weinraub, supra note 76, at A-18. Frank Price, currently a producer and formerly 
Chairman of Columbia Pictures, claims that "[wlhat they don't like is that audiences find 
American entertainment desirable. They want to prevent that." Id. Other executives concur, 
noting that the United States fixes no limits on the importation offoreign films. Id. The main 
difference, of course, lies in the fact that there is negligible interest in foreign films in the 
United States, while top 1993 U.S. films like 'Jurassic Park," ''The Fugitive," and "The Firm" 
have enjoyed phenomenal success overseas. Id. Martin Scorcese, one of the most prominent 
filmmakers to comment on the issue, stated that "[c]losing the borders would not guarantee 
a rise in creativity in the local countries or even a rise of interest on the part of local 
audiences." Id. 
83 See Dodwell, supra note 80, at 6. Before the EU achieved its objective of exempting 
audiovisual products from the GATT accord, U.S. negotiators presented a four-part compro-
mise. Id. First, U.S. negotiators agreed to permit the EU to continue to reserve half of local 
programming to European television productions, but the United States wanted this to apply 
to the entire 24-hour day. Id. This would have removed the current ban on non-European 
productions in prime time. Id. Second, for emerging signals like satellite and cable, U.S. 
negotiators proposed to allow the EU to control 50-70% of all the channels, as long as each 
channel did not have to carryover 50% European content. Id. With this quota applied to 
each individual channel, the survival of specialty stations like the Disney Channel and Nick-
elodeon might be in danger. See Dodwell, supra note 80, at 6. Third, U.S. negotiators proposed 
that U.S. entities and artists be entitled to their "fair share" of the taxes collected on blank 
audio and video tapes. Id. In return, the United States would make a commitment to invest 
a portion of the money earned in Europe's film and television industries. Id. Fourth, U.S. 
negotiators felt that "pay-per-view" channels should not be restricted because consumers 
should be allowed to make a free choice to watch a certain film. Id. This proposal was 
summarily rebuffed and the audiovisual exemption to the GATT accord thus became a reality. 
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cerns on both sides of the debate: although the EU's goal of pre-
serving its own cultural identity is legitimate and important,84 the 
means employed to achieve this goal-the quota system-neverthe-
less appear tainted by economic protectionism, a practice discour-
aged by GATT. 85 
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE EXEMPTION OF AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS 
FROM GATT AND FORECASTS OF FUTURE TRENDS 
Until recently, only France strived to enforce the restrictions of 
the Directive.86 In the wake of the cultural exemption to the GATT 
accord, however, the trend in the EU is toward greater regulation 
of audiovisual products.87 Accordingly, even traditionally less restric-
84 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. 
86 Dougan, supra note 12, at B7. France, in fact, fined Canal Cinq, its popular independent 
television channel, millions of francs for showing too many U.S.-made productions. Id. This 
ultimately contributed to the demise of the channel. Id. 
87 Indeed, the European Federation of Audiovisual Producers (FERAl, a Brussels-based 
director's lobbying group, proposes fifteen measures to improve the film and broadcasting 
industries in Europe. Audiovisual Sector: 15 Steps to Galvanise European Industry, EUR. REp., 
Feb. 26, 1994, at sect. IV (internal relations), No. 1929. FERA proposes a system of tax 
incentives to encourage financial investment in European films, a mechanism to allow pay-TV 
companies to broadcast films just one year after they debut in movie houses, and an overhaul 
of the "Television Without Frontiers" Directive. Id. In addition, FERA proposes the creation 
of a "High Authority for the Audiovisual Sector," modeled after the U.S. Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC). Id. The FERA plan proposes to: (1) establish a tax incentive system 
in Europe to encourage investment in the distribution and promotion of European films; (2) 
set up cinema hall networks (in the form of a European Economic Interest Grouping) 
throughout Europe and give them backing through an EU-funded program; (3) create 
facilities for the routine dubbing of films into the five main European languages (German, 
English, Spanish, French and Italian); (4) promote the widespread use by cinema halls of 
European technology for multilingual projections and offer tax incentives towards this end; 
(5) create an inter-trade body for the promotion, circulation and distribution of European-
made films; (6) offer cinema hall operators a minimum sum to offset any loss they suffer from 
showing "financially risky" European films and helping to draw the public in to see European 
films; (7) extend the pay-TV system (of the Canal+ type) to each country with a requirement 
to invest in national production in return for being able to broadcast films only 12 months 
after they come out in the cinema halls; (8) develop financial joint production initiatives 
between Member States by means of joint production agreements and revising present agree-
ments; (9) open up European aid schemes and the regulatory framework to Central and East 
European countries by using the resources of the PHARE and TACIS programs; (10) ensure 
that some of the resources from regional funds are transferred to the EU; (11) replace (as 
far as possible) the automatic subsidy system by the repayable loan scheme (advances on 
receipts); (12) set up a receipt guarantee fund operating by redistributing national and Union 
receipts between various film distributors; (13) ensure the preservation of the European 
cinema heritage and use education to promote access to cinema culture and training in 
cinema-related trades; (14) take care in each country with a cinema or audiovisual industry 
and infrastructure to safeguard the working resources of the professionals and the human 
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tive countries like Germany and the United Kingdom are now en-
acting specific restraints upon U.S. programming.88 Moreover, France 
and Spain have enacted laws even broader in scope and more 
restrictive than the Directive's quotaS.89 Consequently, the French 
parliament has approved a law, directly affecting the radio industry, 
which requires at least forty percent of songs played on French radio 
stations to be in French.90 Likewise, in Spain, a theater must now 
allot one day for screening European-produced films for every two 
days that it screens films from the United States.9) 
Granted, if the EU's objectives in exempting audiovisual prod-
ucts from the GATT accord were solely concerned with preserv-
ing or subsidizing culture, opposition to these policies would be 
unfounded.92 As an illegitimate means of economic protectionism, 
however, the system opposes one of the functions of GATT: to 
increase and encourage international trade93 while limiting the pro-
tectionist tendencies of its members.94 
Despite the trend toward greater restrictions within the EU, the 
means employed-a quota system--cannot persist indefinitely.95 First, 
the quota system will collapse because it is motivated not by the valid 
objective of cultural preservation, but, rather, by the illegitimate goal 
of economic protectionism.96 Second, even if the objective employed 
is legitimate cultural preservation, the quota system approach can-
not endure in such a fast-growing industry.97 If preservation of cul-
ture is permitted to be used as a justification for restriction within 
the entertainment industry, this same standard may be used by other 
countries to regulate all forms of information for transmission.98 
capital needed in the manufacture of films; and (15) amend the Directive by evening out the 
definition of European works and making the text less binding. [d. 
88 Dougan, supra note 12, at B7. 
89 Chapman, supra note 75, at 3C. 
90 [d. 
91 See id. 
92 See Dougan, supra note 12, at B7. In reality, almost every country-including the United 
States-attempts to preserve its own culture through the use of subsidies and fiscal incentives. 
[d. Indeed, preserving culture may be a justifiable, if not a necessary, goal in the EU as well. 
See generally Kaplan, supra note 56, for a cogent commentary discussing the reality of the 
European cultural crisis. 
93 See Laursen, supra note 7, at 375; Ross, supra note 3, at 558. 
94 Thompson, supra note 5, at 5. 
95 Dougan, supra note 12, at B7. 
96 See supra notes 79--82 and accompanying text. 
97 See Dougan, supra note 12, at B7. 
98 Dougan, supra note 12, at B7; Ross, supra note 3, at 558. In addition, Ross concludes: "If 
such a cultural protection is accepted by the trading world, other nations will be inclined to 
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Moreover, this trend could be exacerbated in the future as rapidly 
expanding computer technology blurs boundaries between the dif-
ferent media of television, sound and film.99 
Third, EU Member States, through the quota system, are denying 
their citizens the basic freedom to choose which audiovisual prod-
ucts they wish to access.IOO This freedom is codified in article 19 of 
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights which guarantees 
the "right to freedom of expression and opinion."101 This article 
expressly states that" [t] his right includes the freedom to hold opin-
ions without interference and to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."lo2 By 
imposing quotas on foreign audiovisual products, the EU is infring-
ing on these important, universally-recognized rights. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to pass the GATT accord, the United States ceded to the 
economic protectionist views of the EU. Although the audiovisual 
exemption to GATT is now in place, the United States should con-
tinue to fight for a more open market in this industry. In a free 
market, media producers and entertainment companies should be 
allowed to prosper from the distribution of quality productions 
regardless of cultural content. Indeed, because GATT encourages 
free trade, it should not condone economic protectionism disguised 
as cultural preservation. 
Because the EU will be unable to control booming developments 
in communications technology, protectionist measures regarding 
audiovisual products will not be effective in the long run. In addi-
tion, such an easily manipulated standard may be dangerous to a 
broad range of industries in the future. Moreover, even if the meas-
ures are protectionist in the cultural, rather than the economic 
sense, members of the EU public should not be deprived of their 
right to choose whatever audiovisual product they prefer without 
regard to country of origin or cultural content. 
Howard M. Endelman 
employ it to protect their own industries. Quotas on films, music, and books all would fit 
comfortably within this fallacious cultural protection rationale." Id. 
99 See Dougan, supra note 12, at B7. 
100 !d. 
IOI United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
102Id. 
